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An Immovable Object and an
Unstoppable Force: Reconciling the
First Amendment and
Antidiscrimination Laws in the
Claybrooks Court
ABSTRACT

This Note broadly addresses the problem of racial stereotyping
and racial roles in the media. It is viewed through the lens of
Claybrooks v. ABC, Inc., a recent federal district court decision of first
impression. In Claybrooks, the court dismissed the plaintiffs
discrimination claims, ruling that casting decisions were protected
under the First Amendment. This Note will address the problem of
racial discrimination by focusing on racial misrepresentationsin the
media and the role of reality television programs in that landscape.
Specifically, this Note will propose a new solution for the Claybrooks
court.
This analysis will assert that cast members should be
considered employees, thus subjecting television networks to the legal
liabilities under employment and labor laws. Furthermore, a special
caveat should be created for casting decisions in race- and gender
neutral reality television programming that should not be subject to
protection under the FirstAmendment.
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Over the years, Hollywood has become notorious for glitz,
glamor, legendary icons, cinematic masterpieces, and making dreams
of aspiring actors and actresses come true.' But not all that glitters
in Tinseltown 2 is gold. 3
Hollywood possesses a less glamorous
trait-stereotyping and misrepresenting racial minorities.4 When a
casting director seeks out a bright young actress to fill the leading role
in his latest screenplay, that role, despite being written as
race-neutral, is typically filled by a Caucasian actress. 5 Despite being
a race-neutral role, James Bond, international man of mystery and
British Spy, has been cast and played by eleven Caucasian actors. 6
Hollywood has historically cast people of color in roles only
when a person of color is specifically called for.7 Actors of color have
1.
See Hollywood,
California,
LAtourist.com,
http://www.latourist.com/?page=
hollywood (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
2.
Tinseltown is a nickname for Hollywood, California, named for the glitz and
glamour associated with the movie industry.
3.
See generally Parthenia (Ruthie) 0. Grant, Cultural Racism in Hollywood and the
Media,

RUTHIEOGRANT.ORG,

http://ruthieogrant.org/articles/Cultural%20Racism%20in%20

Hollywood%20and%20the%2OMedia.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
4.
See id.
5.
See Eva Hattie L. Schueler, 'Hunger Games' Casting: Why Jennifer Lawrence
Shouldn't
Play
Katniss,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
1,
2012,
3:25
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/01/hunger-games-movie-n_1314053.html
(discussing
casting Jennifer Lawrence in the lead role in the Hunger Games, despite the character being
described as having a darker complexion and hair).
6.
See generally Breeanna Hare, Idris Elba: I'd Consider Playing James Bond, CNN
(Sept. 29, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/28/showbiz/celebrity-news-gossip/idriselba-james-bond/ (discussing rumors that Idris Elba is set to be the first black actor to portray
James Bond).
7.
See Grant, supra note 3.
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historically been typecast, shut out of leading roles, and grossly
underrepresented in films and television shows." As a result, the
public's perception of racial minorities and race relations in the United
States has been greatly skewed.9
In recent years, there has been an explosion in the number of
reality-based programs featured on network and cable television.1 0
Like Hollywood and the mass media, these reality television programs
have perpetuated racial stereotypes, limited roles for people of color,
subjected people of color to discriminatory practices, and excluded
But unlike Hollywood, which is a
racial minorities altogether."
platform of artistic development and the creation of art, reality
television is supposed to be just that-reality. 12 If reality television
programming aims to stay true to reality, then something must be
done to combat the skewed public perception of what our society
looks like and to portray racial minorities for what they truly
are-contributing members of society who add value and diversity to
our collective community.1 3
This Note investigates the problem of racial stereotyping in the
It analyzes and criticizes Claybrooks v. American
media.
BroadcastingCompanies, a recent decision from the US District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee. 14 Dismissing the plaintiffs
Section 1981 discrimination claims, the court in Claybrooks found that
network executives of The Bachelor were free to make casting
decisions designed to prevent the likelihood of interracial dating
the First
under
were protected
casting decisions
because
Amendment.15
8.
UCLA,

See DARNELL HUNT ET AL., RALPH J. BUNCHE CTR. FOR AFRICAN AM. STUDIES AT
6-8
(Feb.
2014),
available at
HOLLYWOOD
DIVERSITY
REPORT
2014

http://www.bunchecenter.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/2014-Hollywood-DiversityReport-2-12-14.pdf (showing that in 2011, 89.5 percent of male leading roles were played by
white actors, and that in broadcast comedies and dramas, 94.9 percent lead actors were white).
9.
Grant, supra note 3 ("[Tlhe unsettling reality today remains that when Asian,
Chicano, Native American or African American children turn on the television set and see their
race depicted very little, if at all on mainstream television; or, alternatively, portrayed a
stereotype, or a criminal on network news, a subliminal message is sent and received.").

10.
See Bill Carter, Tired of Reality TV, but Still Tuning In, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/13/business/media/13reality.html?-r=0.
11.
See Kate Lyons, Why Hollywood is Frozen in the 1950s: White Men are Still King of
the Silver Screen with Lead Roles Going to Just 26% of Women and 11% of Minorities, DAILY

MAIL (Feb. 20, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2563561/Hollywood-placewhite-men-New-study-finds-women-minorities-dramatically-underrepresented-filmstelevision.html.
12.
But see L. Brent Bozell III, 'Reality Shows' Distort the Real World, CNS NEWS (Oct.
21, 2011, 4:34 AM), http://cnsnews.com/blog/1-brent-bozell-iiilreality-shows-distort-real-world.
See Lyons, supra note 11.
13.
14.
Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 998 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
15.
Id. at 988.
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This Note addresses the problem of racial discrimination
within the media by focusing on the Claybrooks decision and reality
television programming.' 6 Specifically, this Note proposes a new
solution for courts addressing similar Claybrooks questions. The
analysis will assert that cast members of reality-based network
television shows should be considered employees, thus subjecting
television networks and network executives to the legal liabilities
under employment and labor laws. Furthermore, a special caveat
should be carved out of the First Amendment for casting decisions in
race- and gender-neutral reality television programming that would
allow certain regulations on the casting process that would otherwise
be protected under the First Amendment.
Part I of this Note focuses on an exploration of race and the
media, an overview of anti-discrimination laws and the First
Amendment, and the Claybrooks decision. Part II analyzes how
courts have navigated the First Amendment as it relates to
anti-discrimination laws by examining possible solutions and the past
regulatory schemes leading up to the Claybrooks decision. Part III
proposes that a special exception to the First Amendment's
broad protection should be created for casting decisions in race- and
gender-neutral roles in reality television programs. Furthermore, cast
members of reality television shows should be considered employees,
placing them and their employer networks under the umbrella of Title
VII's anti-discrimination laws. Finally, Part IV concludes with a
discussion of the implications in the media regarding the shifting
attitudes toward classically stereotyped groups and the effect of this
solution on racial misperceptions going forward.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Race and the Media
Cultural racism comes into play when a racial majority uses
its power and influence to impose their "cultural heritage .

.

. upon

others, while at the same time destroying the culture of ethnic
minorities."1 7 This statement holds the most truth when examining
race relations and the media.' 8 Television and other forms of media
serve as "powerful priming agents, activating constructs that
16.
See generally id. at 989 (discussing the plaintiffs experience with reality television
producers of The Bachelor).
17.
Grant, supra note 3 (quoting Geneva Gay, Racism in America, Imperatives for
Teaching Ethnic Studies, in NAT'L COUNCIL FOR THE SOC. STUDIES, TEACHING ETHNIC STUDIES:
CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES 27, 33 (James A. Banks, ed., 43d Y.B. 1973)).
18.
See id.
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subsequently influence social judgment."1 9 Throughout history, racial
minorities have been subject to discriminatory depictions, stereotypes,
and racism as they are portrayed in the media as well as their status
in the entertainment industry. 20 Moreover, television depictions of
minorities "have been shown to influence whites' perceptions of those
groups."21 As a consequence, these visual misrepresentations by the
media convey the message that whites and people of color exist within
separate moral universes, giving the impression that people of color
are different than whites. 22
1. Racial Typecasting and Whitewashing
Historically, Hollywood has perpetuated many racially and
culturally insensitive stereotypes by typecasting actors and actresses
of color, by only rewarding actors and actresses of color for playing
stereotypical roles, and for ignoring artistic endeavors that cast
minorities in a positive light.2 3 When Steven Spielberg, who has won
Oscars for war epics, Saving Private Ryan and Schindler's List,
directed the critically acclaimed movie, The Color Purple, it did not
24
win an Oscar, despite being nominated for eleven Academy Awards.
Moreover, despite great box office success and many industry insiders'
belief that Spielberg would win the Oscar for Best Director, he failed
to be nominated. 25 Another classic example is Spike Lee's Malcolm X,
starring Denzel Washington as the title role. 26 Despite being regarded
by critics as one of Washington's most iconic roles, both the movie and
Washington failed to be rewarded by the Academy. 27 More recent
examples include director Ava DuVernay and actor David Oyelowo in
28
2014's critically acclaimed Selma.

Thomas E. Ford, Effects of Stereotypical Television Portrayalsof African-Americans
19.
on Person Perception, 60 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 266 (1997).
See Grant, supra note 3.
20.
Ford, supra note 19, at 271 ("The results of this experiment support the hypothesis
21.
that when whites are exposed to negative stereotypical television portrayals of AfricanAmericans, they are more likely to make negative judgments of an African-American target
person.").
See ROBERT S. LICHTER & DANIEL R. AMUNDSON, DISTORTED REALITY: HISPANIC
22.
CHARACTERS IN TV ENTERTAINMENT (1994).

See Grant, supra note 3.
23.
See Andre Soares, Steven Spielberg-The Color Purple: Biggest Oscar Saubs #2, ALT
24.
FILM GUIDE (Jan. 29, 2011, 7:45 PM), http://www.altfg.com/blog/awards/steven-spielberg-thecolor-purple-oscar-snubs-44881/.
See id.
25.
26.
MALCOLM X (40 Acres & A Mule Filmworks 1992).
Denzel Washington was nominated for his role by the Academy.
27.
SELMA (Cloud Eight Films, Celador Films, Harpo Films, Path6, Plan B
28.
Entertainment 2014).
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These slights are anecdotal examples of a consistent diversity
gap in Hollywood. 29 Of the nearly 6,000 Academy Awards voters, 94
percent are white, with the remaining 6 percent being comprised of
2 percent black, less than 2 percent of Hispanic origin, and less
than 1 percent Asian or Native American descent. 30 Moreover, in
eighty-seven years, 9 percent of Best Actor winners have been men of
color, 1 percent of Best Actress winners have been women of color, and
in the last twelve years, no Best Actress or Best Actor winner has
been of Latino, Asian, or Native American descent. 31 As a result,
many racial minorities have felt that Hollywood is sending them a
resounding message-movies and roles depicting African Americans
and other racial minorities in a non-stereotypical or positive light are
of little importance. 32
In 2001 and 2002, two historical events occurred in Hollywood:
in 2001, Denzel Washington became the first African American male
to win the Best Actor Academy Award in thirty-eight years for his role
in Training Day;33 and in 2002, Halle Berry became the first African
American woman 34 to win the Best Actress Academy Award for her
role in the movie, Monster's Ball.3 5 Prior to Berry's win, the only
African American female to win an Oscar for an acting role was Hattie
McDaniel for her role as "Mammy" in Gone with the Wind.36
Washington's and Berry's Oscars, while met with mostly praise
and joy, were not universally well received by the African American

29
See
Oscar
Academy
Demographics,
CRITICAL
MEDIA
PROJECT,
http://www.criticalmediaproject.org/cml/medialoscar-academy-demographics/ (last visited Feb.
10, 2014).
30.
Id.; Paula Bernstein, The Diversity Gap in the Academy Awards in Infographic
Form, INDIEWIRE (Feb. 25, 2014, 12:42 PM), http://www.indiewire.comlarticle/the-diversity-gapin-the-academy-awards-in-infographic-form.
31.
Oscar Academy Demographics, supra note 29. See generally Amy Goodman, Selma
Director Ava DuVernay on Hollywood's Lack of Diversity, Oscar Snub and #OscarsSoWhite
Hashtag, DEMOCRACY NOW (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.democracynow.org/2015/1/27/selma
directorava-duvernay-on-hollywoods ("I think ...
folks see films, see history, see art, see life
through their own lens. And when there's a consensus that has to be made by a certain
group . . . the consensus is most likely going to be through a specific lens. And unless there's
diversity amongst the people that are trying to come to a consensus, then . . . there will be a lack
of diversity in what the consensus is . . . .").
32.
See Goodman, supra note 31; Grant, supra note 3.
33.
TRAINING DAY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2001).
34.
The first African American woman to win an Academy Award was Hattie McDaniel
in 1940 for her depiction of "Mammy" in Gone With the Wind. GONE WITH THE WIND (MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios 1939). Hattie McDaniel's win, like Berry's was met with much criticism
for portraying the stereotypical role of a house slave. Id.
35.
MONSTER'S BALL (Lions Gate Films 2002).
36.

GONE WITH THE WIND, supra note 34.
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population. 37 This was due to the nature of the roles played by Berry
and Washington. 38 Denzel Washington's character was a crooked
police officer and gangster head of a criminal ring.39 Similarly, Halle
Berry portrayed a poor African American woman, saved from a life of
poverty by the white corrections officer who oversaw the execution of
her late husband, a convicted murderer. 40 Many members of the
African American community saw these awards as Hollywood
perpetuating and rewarding the depiction of stereotypical roles that
too often frame the African American community-that of gangster,
criminal, destitute, and sexual object. 4 1 As a result, many of these
stereotypes have become universally accepted by members of the
white community, fostering false notions of the African American's
role in society. 42
African Americans are not the only racial minority group
subjected to misrepresentations by the media. Asian Americans are
stereotypically depicted as the hard working and successful minority
group, martial arts warriors, submissive geishas, fortune tellers, and
Chinese mafia bosses. 43 Moreover, misrepresentations in the media
lead to overgeneralizations, like the Asian American population being
categorically mislabeled as Chinese and Latinos being referred to as
Mexicans. 44
Latinos are also subjected to a host of racial stereotypes in the
45
media.
As a group, Latinos are restricted to roles depicting them as
comedians, criminals, sexual objects, and police officers. 46 Moreover,
Latinos are often depicted as inarticulate, lacking intelligence and
education, and portraying characters with traits such as laziness and
verbal aggression. 47
These negative depictions have drastic

37.
See Grant, supra note 3 (explaining that Denzel Washington "was denied awards for
playing non-stereotypical, positive and compelling roles such as Malcolm X and Hurricane
Carter, while rewarded for portraying a crooked cop").

38.

See id.

39.

See TRAINING DAY, supra note 33.

40.

See MONSTER'S BALL, supra note 35.

41.

See Grant, supra note

3 (explaining that members

of the African American

community did not hesitate to speak out against Washington's and Berry's awards).
42.
See id.
43.
See Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and
AntidiscriminationNorms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25 (2007).
44.
Emily Drew, Pretendingto Be "Postracial"-The Spectacularizationof Race in Reality
TV's Survivor, 12 TELEVISION NEWS MEDIA 326, 330-31 (2011).
45.
See id.
46.
Dana E. Maestro, Elizabeth Behm-Morawitz & Maria A. Kopacz, Exposure to
Television Portrayalsof Latinos: The Implications of Aversive Racism and Social Identity Theory,
34 HUM. CoMM. RES. 1 (2008).
47.

Id.
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consequences, considering many white Americans get a "bulk of
information about Latinos" from the media. 48
Similarly, Arab Americans are categorically cast in a negative
light in the media as villains and terrorists. 49 Native Americans are
depicted as exotic others within society, often "wearing tribal gear or
performing rituals."5 0 Consequently, white perception of minority
groups are shaped and influenced by these narrow and negative
representations.
Additionally, minorities also deal with a systematically
whitewashed society in which their roles within society are subject to
further marginalization.5 1 Despite the box office success and high
ratings that television shows and films with more diverse casts
experience, the media continues to engage in whitewashing minority
characters on the big screen. 52 In 2014's Exodus: Gods and Kings,
director Ridley Scott cast three white actors-Christian Bale, Joel
Edgerton, and Sigourney Weaver-to play the leading roles of the
prophet Moses, and Egyptian royalty Ramses and Queen Tuya. 53
Scott described wanting to cast Bale at the onset, describing him as
"the definition of Moses." 5 4 These casting decisions stood in stark
contrast to the roles of the slaves, servants, and low class civilians, all
of which were played by actors of color.5 5 The lack of positive roles for
people of color in movies and network programming, combined with
the media's systematic whitewashing in popular culture, has created a
distorted public perception of people of color. 56
48.
Id.
49.
Alex Abad-Santos, Hollywood Likes to Pretend that Ancient Egypt was Full of White
People, Vox (Aug. 4, 2014, 12:30 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/4/5955253/Hollywood-egyptwhite-people-exodus-gods-and-kings.
50.
Robinson, supra note 43.
51.
See Abad-Santos, supra note 49.
52.
See HUNT ET AL., supra note 8, at 27 ("[In 2011] the 25 films that were from 21
percent to 30 percent minority posted a median global box office of $160.1 million-a figure
considerably higher than the medians for all other diversity intervals . . . median household
ratings peaked for broadcast comedies and dramas that were from 41 percent to 50 percent
minority.").
53.
Kaitlin Reilly, 'Exodus: Gods and Kings' Trailer Proves Hollywood Hasn't Learned
Much About Diverse Casting, BUSTLE (July 9, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/articles/30956exodus-gods-and-kings-trailer-proves-hollywood-hasnt-learned-much-about-diverse-casting.
54.
Exclusive: Ridley Scott Q & A for 'Exodus: Gods and Kings,' YAHOO ENT. (Aug. 27,
2014, 9:00 AM), https://au.movies.yahoo.comlon-show/article/-/24819148/exclusive-ridley-scott-qand-a-for-exodus-gods-and-kings/.
55.
See id.
56.
See id.; see also Tanya Ghahremani, 25 Minority Characters That Hollywood
Whitewashed, COMPLEX (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2013/04/25-minoritycharacters-that-hollywood-whitewashed/the-good-earth (identifying other recent examples of
whitewashing as Jake Gyllenhaal being cast as the lead in Prince of Persia:The Sands of Time;
two white actors being cast in The Last Airbender in roles written for Asian actors; Johnny
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2. Race and Reality Television
While racial misrepresentations in the media have been a
prevalent concern, reality television presents an even greater
problem.5 7 In 2002, the number of people who cast votes to select a
winner for the first season of American Idol surpassed the number of
people who voted in the 2000 US presidential election.5 8 This mass
appeal has moved reality television programming to the forefront of
popular culture, with nearly 70 percent of cable programming
comprised of reality television shows. 59 Moreover, despite the fact
that reality television contributes to an increase in minority
representation on television, and despite its potential to serve as a
forum for misrepresented groups to dispel historically inaccurate
depictions, the roles occupied by minorities in reality shows often
serve to perpetuate minority stereotypes.6 0 One example is that of the
angry black female on the show Flavor of Love, where the majority of
cast members were black females who were depicted as angry black
women, possessing "characteristics of ghetto behavior." 6 1 Moreover,
nicknames ascribed to contestants like "Red Oyster" for an Asian
American, "Miss Latin" for a Hispanic woman, and "Deelishis" for an
African American woman with a curvy figure and pronounced

Depp's casting and depiction of Tonto, the Native American sidekick, in The Lone Ranger;
Jennifer Connelly's depiction of John Nash's Salvadoran wife, Alicia, in A Beautifutl Mind;
Jennifer Lawrence's depiction of Katniss Everdeen in The Hunger Games, despite the character's
description being "nonwhite" and "olive-skinned" in the novel; and Ben Affleck's depiction of
Tony Mendez, a C.I.A. agent of Hispanic decent, in Argo).
Drew, supra note 44, at 330.
57.
Rachel E. Dubrofsky, The Bachelor: Whiteness in the Harem, 23 CRITICAL STUD.
58.
MEDIA COMM. 39, 39 (2006).
See id.; see also HUNT ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (noting that, in the 2011-2012
59.
season, 68.8 percent of shows on cable were comprised of reality television programming).
See generally Rachel E. Dubrofsky & Antoine Hardy, PerformingRace in Flavor of
60.
Love and The Bachelor, 25 CRITICAL STUD. MEDIA COMM. 373, 374 (2008) ("A remarkable
aspect of the genre is the fostering of an unprecedented racial diversity on the small
screen . . . . Discussions of race look at how the television industry governs representations of
black bodies and constructs race in a particular way.").
Id. at 385; see also Nadra Kareen Nittle, Five Common Black Stereotypes in TV and
61.
http://racerelations.about.com/od/hollywooda/Five-Common-BlackNEWS,
ABOUT
Film,
Stereotypes-In-Tv-And-Film.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) ("When Bravo debuted the reality
show 'Married to Medicine' in Spring 2013, black female physicians unsuccessfully petitioned the
network to pull the plug on the program. 'For the sake of integrity and character of black female
physicians, we must ask that Bravo immediately remove and cancel 'Married to Medicine' from
its channel . . . . Black female physicians only compose one percent of the American workforce of
physicians. Due to our small numbers, the depiction of black female doctors in media, on any
scale, highly affects the public's view on the character of all future and current African-American
female doctors."').
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posterior, reduce them to representations of their race and existing
stereotypes. 6 2
On The Apprentice, a black male character was described as
having "street smarts" and was the owner of a shoe shining
company.6 3 Moreover, a study of ten different reality television
programs revealed that African Americans were often portrayed as
physical aggressors and inciters of altercations among cast members. 64
In addition, viewers who watch reality-based programming tend to
view these programs as a depiction of real life. 6 5 Thus, reality
programming has an increasingly larger impact precisely because of
the hegemonic power associated with describing something as
"reality," and because it is generally accepted as more real or
authentic by viewing audiences. 66
B. Legal Background
1. Antidiscrimination Laws: Title VII and Section 1981
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196467 prohibits
discriminatory practices in the context of employment. Specifically,
Section 703 of Title VII specifies that adverse employment practices,
i.e., failing to hire, fire, or treat disparately, by employers based on the
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" of an employee or job
applicant is an unlawful employment practice. 68

Dubrofsky & Hardy, supra note 60, at 381, 383; see also Jennifer Pozner, Reality TV
62.
Exploits Women, Minorities, and Children, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2014, 10:40 AM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/10/21/are-reality-shows-worse-than-othertv/reality-tv-exploits-women-minorities-and-children (describing Flavor of Love as a "modern day
minstrel show" that portrays "black and Latina women as ignorant 'ghetto' 'hos,' and men of
color as clowns, thugs and criminals").

Tia Tyree, African American Stereotypes in Reality Television, 22 How. J. COMM.
63.
394, 407 (2011).
Id. at 408.
64.
65.
See id.
66.
Drew, supra note 44, at 330 ("Viewers are more likely to accept the 'bad black'
stereotype, as embodied by Omarosa, because she was a 'real person' in 'real situations' than
they are to accept the same stereotype in film, television, and other media not purporting to be
reality.").
67.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); see Legal Highlight: The Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S.
Dep't of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/crc/civil-rights-act-1964.htm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2015) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Passage of the Act ended the application of 'Jim Crow' laws,
which had been upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1896 case Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the
Court held that racial segregation purported to be 'separate but equal' was constitutional.").
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
68.
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The main theories of discrimination under Title VII fall under
one of two categories-disparate treatment or disparate impact.6 9 The
disparate treatment theory of discrimination prevents employers
from "treating applicants .

.

. differently because of their membership

class."7 0

In contrast, the disparate impact theory
in a protected
prohibits the use of facially neutral employment practices that have a
disproportionately adverse impact on a protected group.71 Over 98
percent of employment discrimination litigation involves disparate
treatment claims; with only 4 percent involving disparate impact
claims. 72 Under Title VII, the employer can be subject to personal
liability as well as vicarious liability as a result of discrimination of an
employee at the hands of a co-worker, supervisor, or independent
contractor. 73
Title VII prohibits employers from printing or publishing any
posts or advertisements associated with employment that indicate a
"preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race,
sex, or color." 74 In the context of casting decisions, an actor who
proves that sex or race played a role in the denial of an employment
opportunity could obtain an injunction against the further use of
discriminatory practices.7 5
The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) is a
narrowly defined statutory defense to sex discrimination, which allows
the applicant's sex to be a consideration in hiring when "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise."76 In the case of a BFOQ, Title VII grants an exception,
allowing employers to publicly post advertisements indicating a sexual
See J. CUNYON GORDON, CHI. LAWYERS' COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, TITLE
69.
VII AND SECTION 1981: A GUIDE FOR APPOINTED ATTORNEYS IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

ILLINOIS 6 (2012), available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/ATTORNEY/2009Title7manual.pdf
(noting under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination "Title VII prohibits employers
from treating applicants or employees differently because of their membership in a protected
class. The central issue is whether the employer's action was motivated by discriminatory intent,
which may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence").
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 22 ("Even where an employer is not motivated by discriminatory intent, Title
VII prohibits an employer from using a facially neutral employment practice that has an
unjustified adverse impact on members of a protected class." (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325 n.15 (1977))).
72.
LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND., CONTESTING WORKPLACE
FEDERAL
OF
OUTCOMES
AND
CHARACTERISTICS
IN
COURT:
DISCRIMINATION
(2008),
available at
at
11
1987-2003,
LITIGATION
DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYMENT
edLreport08_final.
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/nielsen-abf

pdf.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
Robinson, supra note 43, at 29.
Id. at 31.
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preference only in situations where "the essence of the business
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex
exclusively."7 7 Within the context of casting decisions, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines provides for
a BFOQ for actors and actresses where it is vital in order to maintain
authenticity.7 8 But while there is a BFOQ for sex, there is no BFOQ

for race.
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides
protectionist measures for racial minorities from discriminatory
practices by both public and private sector players. 79 Section 1981
specifies that all racial groups within the United States are afforded
the same opportunities as white Americans "to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings."8 0 While Section 1981 does not
expressly authorize a private cause of action, "the [Supreme] Court
has held that § 1981 creates an independent private action for racially
discriminatory employment practices."81
Courts analyze both types of employment discrimination claims
under Title VII and Section 1981 identically-by direct or indirect
evidence assessed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
formulation. 82 Under this burden-shifting approach, the plaintiff
must: "(1) establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the
employer must then articulate, through admissible evidence, a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; and (3) in order to
prevail, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's stated reason is a
pretext to hide discrimination." 83 A plaintiffs claim that passes this
three-part analysis will survive a defendant employer's summary
judgment motion. 84
2. First Amendment and Wide Latitude for Artistic Creation
The First Amendment of the US Constitution provides a
safeguard for two of the most fundamental notions of liberty-freedom
of religion and freedom of expression8 5 from government
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C.
Id.

81.

See STEVEN H. STEINGLASS,

§

1981 (2012).
1 SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS

§

4:5

(2014).
82.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Id.
83.
84.
Id.
85.
There are five freedoms of expression: freedom of the press, assembly, petition,
religion, and speech. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

793

AN IMMOVABLE OBJECT

2015]

interference. 86 It states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ."8 Protectionist
measures under the First Amendment are founded on the rationale
that in a democratic and free society, individuals must be afforded the
fear of governmental
themselves without
right to express
8
Among the types of speech protected under the Free
interference.
Speech Clause of the First Amendment is the artistic freedom of
expression, which is founded on the rationale that artistic freedom in
the creation of art is in the interest of society's cultural and political
Among the protections afforded by the freedom of
awareness.8 9
artistic expression is the artist's right to "create, display, perform, and
sell their artwork."9 o
The Supreme Court requires a strong justification before the
government may interfere with or regulate the content of artistic
expression. 91 Historically, the right to freedom of speech and artistic
expression has been given wide latitude by the courts and has been
Two
interpreted quite broadly, with a few choice exceptions. 92
principles come into play when courts deal with a challenge to the
right of artistic expression-content neutrality and direct and
imminent harm. 93

86.
87.

See id.
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.

88.

Freedom of Expression in the Arts and Entertainment,AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

(Feb. 27, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/freedom-expression-arts-and-entertainment.
89.

See id.; see also JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW,

para. 15 (1765) ("[T]he jaws of power are always open to devour, and her arm is always stretched
out, if possible, to destroy the freedom of thinking, speaking, and writing."), available at
Benjamin Franklin,
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtlD=3&psid=4118;
On Freedom of Speech in the Press, in 2 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: CONTAINING
SEVERAL POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL TRACTS NOT INCLUDED IN ANY FORMER EDITION, AND MANY
LETTERS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE, NOT HITHERTO PUBLISHED; WITH NOTES AND A LIFE OF THE

AUTHOR 285 (Univ. Chicago Press 2014) (1840) ("Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a
free government; when this support is taken away, the constitution of a free society is
dissolved.
90.

Introduction,

NAT'L

CAMPAIGN

FOR

FREEDOM

OF

EXPRESSION,

(last visited Jan. 15, 2014); see also
http://www.thefirstamendment.org/ncfeintro.htm
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Kingsley Int'l Picture Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952) (all finding motion pictures as a form of artistic expression protected by the
First Amendment).
91.

See

First

Amendment:

An

Overview,

LEGAL

INFO.

INST.,

http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first-amendment (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) ("The Supreme
Court requires the government to provide substantial justification for the interference with the
right of free speech where it attempts to regulate the content of the speech. A less stringent test
is applied for content-neutral legislation.").
92.

See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 88.

93.

Id.
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A content-neutral restriction imposes limits on communication
without regard to the message conveyed. 94 In terms of artistic
expression, the government cannot interfere with the freedom of
artistic expression simply because someone is offended by the content
of the art.9 5

The second principle provides that the government can

interfere with the artistic freedom of expression only in instances
where there is a direct and imminent harm to a social interest. 96
Thus, when a regulation furthers an important governmental interest
and is narrowly tailored so that it impedes on the First Amendment
no more than necessary to further that interest, the regulation may
pass constitutional muster.9 7
C. Claybrooks v. ABC
In 2012, Nathaniel Claybrooks and Christopher Johnson, two
African American males, filed a class action lawsuit against ABC, Inc.
and affiliates,9 8 as well as the producers of The Bachelor99 and The
Bachelorette.10 0 After being turned down as potential contestants for
The Bachelor,10 1 Claybrooks and Johnson claimed that ABC, Inc. and
94.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 51 (2000) ("[T]he
requirement that the government be content neutral in its regulation of speech means that the
government must be both viewpoint neutral and subject-matter neutral. The viewpoint-neutral
requirement means that the government cannot regulate speech based on the ideology of the
message. . . . The subject-matter-neutral requirement means that the government cannot
regulate speech based on the topic of the speech).
95.
Id.
Id.; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) ("[W]hen 'speech'
96.
and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms. . . . [T]he Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms:
compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres
in these terms, we think it is clear that a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.").
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
97.
98.
Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 998 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (noting
that affiliates were ABC, Warner Horizon Television, Inc., Next Entertainment, Inc., NZK
Productions, Inc., and Michael Fleiss).
99.
The Bachelor (Next Entertainment, ABC television broadcast) is a reality-based
dating show featuring one single bachelor and many bachelorettes competing to be in a
relationship with the bachelor.
The Bachelorette (Next Entertainment, ABC television broadcast) is a reality-based
100.
dating show featuring one single bachelorette and many bachelors competing to be in a
relationship with the bachelorette.
101.
Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91 ("In 2011, plaintiff Johnson appeared for a
casting call at a hotel in Nashville, Tennessee. In the hotel lobby, a white employee of the
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affiliates violated Section 1981 prohibiting racial discrimination in the
formation of contracts, alleging that the defendants purposefully avoid
casting people of color 0 2 in the leading roles in The Bachelor and The
Bachelorette, engaging in "purposeful segregation in the media," and
denying "persons of color opportunities in the entertainment
industry."1 0 3
The defendants successfully argued a motion to dismiss based
on the theory that the First Amendment prohibits the plaintiffs
claims because regulating casting decisions imposes prohibited
restraints on the content of network programming.10 4 In dismissing
the case, the court explained that the First Amendment protected the
defendants from having to implement race neutral criteria in their
Relying on a principle10 6 set forth in Hurley v.
casting process.10
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,107 the court
found that in "appropriate circumstances, anti-discrimination statutes
of general applicability must yield to the First Amendment." 0 8

defendants stopped Johnson, took his materials, and promised to 'pass them on' to the casting
directors. Johnson observed that the white employee did not stop any of the white Bachelor
applicants who were entering the hotel for the casting call at the same time. Johnson never
heard back from the Defendants about his application. In 2011, plaintiff Claybrooks appeared for
a casting call at a different hotel. In the lobby, all of the other applicants appeared to be white.
Although interview of these white applicants took 45 minutes, Claybrooks's interview lasted only
20 minutes, making him feel that he had been rushed through the interview process without
being given the same opportunity as the white applicants. Like Johnson, Claybrooks never heard
back from the defendants concerning his application. The defendants ultimately selected a white
Bachelor for its 2012 season.").
See Dubrofsky, supra note 58, at 39 ('In the first season, all four women of color in
102.
the initial pool were eliminated by the third week. . . . [T]he only woman of color on the third
season was eliminated in the first week. . . . [T]he only woman of color on the seventh season was
eliminated at the first rose ceremony. The three women of color on the eighth season were
eliminated in the first episode.").
Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 989-90.
103.
Id.
104.
105.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 995-96 ("The factual circumstances in Hurley are not precisely analogous to
106.
those presented in this case-the plaintiffs here are not an advocacy group, for example.
Nevertheless, the Court . . . articulated a general principle that governs the court's analysis in
this case: under appropriate circumstances, anti-discrimination statutes of general applicability
must yield to the First Amendment.").
107.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 996, 1000 ("The plaintiffs' goals here are laudable:
108.
they seek to support the social acceptance of interracial relationships, to eradicate outdated
social taboos, and to encourage television networks not to perpetuate outdated racial stereotypes.
Nevertheless, the First Amendment prevents the plaintiffs from effectuating these goals by
forcing the defendants to employ race-neutral criteria in their casting decisions in order to
'showcase' a more progressive message.").
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II. ANALYSIS

This Note suggests that, in certain contexts, ensuring equal
protection for cast members of reality programs is a significant state
interest, which outweighs the television station's First Amendment
rights to free speech.1 09 While television shows have historically
enjoyed strong freedom of speech protections, the core robust values
behind the First Amendment protections-the freedom of political and
religious speech-are not in danger of being impeded in this context." 0
While free speech is an inalienable right founded in the Constitution,
"it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances.""' While most forms of speech are
protected, at the heart of the First Amendment was the vital
importance of the Founding Fathers to ensure notions of liberty and to
grant citizens of the nation an open forum for the free expression of
political beliefs.112
In the context of casting decisions, notions of liberty are not in
danger of impediment.11 3 Moreover, although television shows enjoy
high protections under the First Amendment, they are not afforded
the highest freedom of speech protections, and thus, are not
completely insulated from governmental interference.11 4
When
casting decisions are viewed through the frame of hiring decisions, the
First Amendment implications are significantly lowered. 15 It is not
the content of the television program that is being regulated, but
rather, the regulation of conduct-that conduct being employment.116
This is relevant because the regulation of speech or content of the
television program would be regarded as a constitutionally prohibited

109.

See generally KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, FREEDOM OF
PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (2014), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf ("With respect to non-content based restrictions, the Court
requires that the governmental interest be 'significant' or 'substantial' or 'important' . . . .").
110.
Neel Sukhatme, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial
Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2836 (2005) ("[S]ome categories of speech such
as political speech, are viewed as being at the core of the First Amendment.").
111.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 71 (1942).
112.
Sukhatme, supra note 110, at 2836.
113.
Id.
114.
Eugene Volokh, PermissibleRestrictions on Expression, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBehecked/topic/208044/First-Amendment/296554[Permissiblerestrictions-on-expression (last updated Jan. 7, 2014).
115.
See Sukhatme, supra note 110, at 2836; see also James Madison, Virginia
Resolution of 1798, H.D. Doc. No. 42 (1798), available at http://dtylercade.eprci.com/
virginia resolution of_1798 ("[T]he right of freely examining public characters and measures,
and of free communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of every other right.").
116.
Sukhatme, supra note 110, at 2840. ("For most expressive conduct, the purpose of
expression is protected but the method of expression is regulable.").
SPEECH
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state intrusion, whereas the regulation of conduct would be
permissible." 7
In other words, at its core, casting for a reality television show
is a hiring decision that should be treated differently than casting
decisions in scripted shows tied to an artistic narrative, where such a
regulation would seek to regulate content.11 8 Thus, since there is
already a federal regime for hiring practices in the workplace,
regulating casting decisions in reality television programs would
merely be a means of extending that regulatory regime to the aspect of
the television industry that deals directly with employment practices,
within a forum where those decisions are tangentially connected to the
artistic process.1 19

The Claybrooks decision was the first time a federal court
examined how to resolve the First Amendment and antidiscrimination
laws in the context of casting decisions.1 20 Despite the novel question
addressed by the court, the First Amendment and antidiscrimination
laws have butted heads in many different contexts. 12 1 These contexts
will be explored by examining how courts have navigated the First
Amendment as it relates to antidiscrimination laws and casting
decisions by examining possible solutions, the shortcomings of past
and current regulatory schemes both inside and outside the context of
the media, and the rationale behind the Claybrooks decision.
A. AntidiscriminationLaws and the Media-The Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification
One possible solution is for courts to create a BFOQ for race.
While there is currently no BFOQ for race, the drafters of Title VII
acknowledged the need within the entertainment industry to cast
actors who possess certain physical attributes, where race was a
necessary element of the project.1 22 A casting director who wants to

See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 94, at 51.
117.
See id.; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (explaining that
118.
restraints on conduct are content-neutral restrictions and subject to intermediate scrutiny, and
that restraints on content are content-based and subject to strict scrutiny).
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (explaining that discriminating against someone
119.
because of race, religion, color, national origin, or sex is an illegal hiring practice).
See Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 996 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
120.
See generally Hajir Ardebili & Kenneth D. Kronstadt, All's Fair in Love and Reality
121.
Television: First Amendment Protection of Casting in Entertainment Programming, 29 COMM.
LAW. 3 ("Numerous courts have held that . . . the application of antidiscrimination laws may
violate the First Amendment.").
122.
Angela OnWuachi-Willig, There's Just One Hitch, Will Smith: Examining Title VII,
Race, and Casting Discriminationon the FortiethAnniversary of Loving v. Virginia, 319 WIS. L.
REV. 319, 336 (2007).
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cast a black actor to portray a slave, or a Native American actor to
portray Tonto in The Lone Ranger, while prevented from specifying a
racial preference, can specify their desire to cast someone with "the
physical appearance" of a black person or Native American in roles
where the portrayal of that race is crucial to the project. 123
While the First Amendment shielded casting decisions from
anti-discrimination laws in Claybrooks, the BFOQ and the idea of
casting based on physical attributes raises a host of implications. 12 4
Were an exception to the First Amendment carved out, the recognition
of a BFOQ for race would arm networks with a tool allowing
intentional casting discrimination, couched in terms of necessity to the
project. 125 Moreover, using race as a qualification for a job is the very
type of employment practice Title VII seeks to prevent. 126 Thus, a
BFOQ for race as a solution to casting discrimination would likely
prove more harm than good.127
Conversely, carving an exception to casting decisions without
recognizing a new BFOQ for race could subject shows like Jersey
Shore and Shahs of Sunset, and networks like Lifetime and BET,
which aim to represent certain cultural and ethnic groups, to
antidiscrimination laws that threaten their content. 128 Thus, in the
realm of casting decisions and subjecting them to antidiscrimination
laws, finding the proper balance between the exception and the rule is
of vital importance. 129
B. FairnessDoctrine, Grutter, and the Goals of Diversity
The broad protections under the First Amendment are subject
to scrutiny in areas where the government finds a compelling reason
to regulate.
During the 1960s, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) implemented a regulatory solution aimed at

123.
See 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark) ("Although there is no
exemption in Title VII for occupations in which race might be deemed a bona fide job
qualification, a director of a play or movie who wished to cast an actor in the role of a Negro,
could specify that he wished to hire someone with the physical appearance of a Negro . . . .").
124.
See generally OnWuachi-Willig, supra note 122, at 336 (explaining that drafters,
when considering the BFOQ, considered hiring and acting and appearances).
125.
See generally id. at 340 ("[W]here race improperly creeps into those decisions, illegal
discrimination has occurred.").
126.
See Michael Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment
Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 474, 508 (2001).
127.
See generally id. ("Congress made an intentional decision not to include race or color
in the BFOQ provision.").
128.
See Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 998 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
129.
See generally id. ("Applying antidiscrimination laws to casting decisions in this
manner would threaten the content of various television programs . . . .").
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addressing misrepresentations in the media-the Fairness Doctrine.
The doctrine, which was first instituted in the late 1940s, required
broadcasters to include public issues in their programming, allowing
all sides to be heard on such issues, due to their operation of public
license and publically owned airwaves. 130 During that time, President
Johnson appointed a commission to investigate the environmental
factors that contributed to the 1967 race riots. 13 1 The commission
found that print and broadcast media's futile efforts in accurately
depicting to the American majority the trials and tribulations of the
African American citizen had ultimately failed.1 32 Consequently, the
majority of white Americans were relatively uninformed as to the
social perspectives of the black community.1 33
The FCC sought to improve the media's depiction of minorities
by encouraging broadcasters to hire minorities and implement diverse
programming.134 However, under the Reagan Administration, the
FCC voted to revoke the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, removing the
language that created the doctrine from their regulations.1 35 Despite
this, the Fairness Doctrine stood as an example of a compelling
governmental interest in diversity in the context of broadcast
media. 136
In the realm of judicial measures, in Grutter v. Bolinger, the
Supreme Court carved out a narrow rule with arguably broader
implications when it found diversity to be a compelling governmental
interest sufficient to survive constitutional scrutiny after Grutter-a
white Michigan resident-was denied admittance to University of
She claimed the university's policies
Michigan Law School.
discriminated against her on the basis of race, contrary to her rights
In its holding, the Court
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 7
established a bright-line rule limiting diversity as a compelling
interest explicitly in the educational setting.1 38

130.

Sarah

Honeycutt,

The Unbearable Whiteness of ABC:

The First Amendment,

Diversity, and Reality Television in the Wake of Claybrooks v. ABC, 66 SMU L. REV. 431, 436
(2013).
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
See id.
135.
Id.
136.
See generally id. at 437 (the Fairness Doctrine was revoked for not being narrowly
tailored to a substantial governmental interest).
137.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003).
138.
Idat 331-32 ("We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of
preparing students for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to 'sustaining our
political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society. This
Court has long recognized that 'education . . . is the very foundation of good citizenship.' For this
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While the Fairness Doctrine was wrought with noble
considerations, it ultimately fell short of its goal of increased media
The Fairness
representation for minorities and the majority.139
Doctrine failed, in large part, because its application had a chilling
effect on the disbursement of information and speech in light of the
However, the doctrine's
increase in informational outlets. 140
considerations for the public good are overwhelmingly present in
Grutter.141
Despite the Court's limited holding in Grutter, confining
diversity as a compelling state interest to the higher educational
realm, the Grutter Court concerned itself with "the civic life of our
Nation," echoing concern for the meaningful participation of all
groups. 142 This broad language suggests that the rationale behind
Grutter "may counsel other institutions" to seek recognition from the
Court. 14 3 Thus, while the Fairness Doctrine has been laid to rest, the
broad themes of civic involvement and concern for the public discussed
in Grutter set the stage for diversity as a compelling governmental
interest to be recognized outside the educational frame set by the
Grutter Court. 144 Moreover, broadcast media and cable television
forums, under the correct set of legal rules, are well situated to
establish regulatory parameters on the basis of diversity as a
compelling governmental interest. 145

reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher
education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity. . . . '[E]nsuring
that public institutions are open and available to all segments of American society, including
people of all races and ethnicities, represents a paramount government objective.' . . . And,
'nowhere is the importance of such openness more acute than in the context of higher education.'
Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is
essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.").
139.
See Donna Schoaff, Meredith Corp. v. FCC; 77 The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine,
77 KY. L.J. 227, 229 (1989).
140.
Id. at 239.
141.
See generally Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents
involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 951 (2008)
(quoting Justice O'Connor, explaining that "education must be accessible to all individuals
regardless of race or ethnicity").
142.
Id.
143.
See generally id. at 948 ("Grutter may counsel other institutions-religious
institutions, media institutions, libraries . . . to seek from the court . . . recognition . . . that they

have special roles to play in the firmament .... ).
144.
See generally Robert A. Caplen, When Batson Met Grutter: Exploring the
Ramifications of the Supreme Court's Diversity Pronouncements Within the Computerized Jury
Selection Paradigm, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 66, 117 (2007) ("[C]itizenship is an evolving,
individualized process that encompasses 'a characteristic of personhood' rather than requiring an
institutionalized setting.").
See generally Adams, supra note 141, at 948.
145.
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C. Content v. Conduct in Past Regulatory Schemes
First Amendment protections are not only afforded to artistic
works, but also to any conduct "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to fall within the scope of [the First Amendment]."146
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, whether a regulation seeks to
regulate content or conduct determines the level of protections
afforded under the First Amendment. 147 The courts have treated
expressive conduct 48 as warranting First Amendment protection in
certain situations. 149 The Supreme Court explained the justification
for extending First Amendment protectionist measures to conduct by
clarifying that some conduct, while not inherently speech, that is done
in order to convey a message or express an idea, can contain "elements
of communication" that sufficiently fall within First Amendment
protection. 150
The test set forth by the Court in determining expressive
conduct considers whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and [whether] . . . the likelihood was great that
1
the message would be understood by those who viewed it."16 Courts

treat expressive conduct that satisfies this criterion with the upmost
protection under the First Amendment, warranting review under a
strict scrutiny standard.152 Conversely, courts subject regulations
relating to plain conduct to the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny
standard. 153 Courts analyze the constitutionality of a regulation on
plain conduct to the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny standard.

146.

Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).

147.

Id.

148.

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) ("[W]e have recognized the

expressive nature of students' wearing of black

involvement
wearing of
involvement
149.
150.
151.

arm bands to protest American military

in Vietnam; of a sit-in by blacks in a 'whites only' area to protest segregation; of the
American military uniforms in a dramatic presentation criticizing American
in Vietnam; and of picketing about a wide variety of causes.").
Frank, supra note 126, at 516.
Spence, 418 U.S. at 409.
Id. at 411.

Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; see also Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL INFORMATION INST.
152.
CORNELL U. LAW SCH., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict-scrutiny ("Strict scrutiny is a form

of judicial review that courts use to determine the constitutionality of certain laws. To pass strict
scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to further a 'compelling governmental
interest,' and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest.").
153.

Intermediate Scrutiny,

LEGAL

INFORMATION

INST.

CORNELL

U.

LAW

SCH.,

http://www.law.cornell.edulwex/intermediate-scrutiny ("Intermediate scrutiny is a test used in
some contexts to determine a law's constitutionality. To pass intermediate scrutiny, the
challenged law must further an important government interest by means that are substantially
related to that interest.").
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Many of the regulatory solutions that have sought to remedy
discriminatory practices have proven unsuccessful because they have
attempted to regulate content instead of conduct. 15 4 In R.A . v. City
of St. Paul, the Court found a hate speech ordinance to be an
unconstitutional content-based restriction on free speech.15 5 The
Court distinguished content-based restrictions from conduct,
explaining that Title VII targets speech that violates laws not because
of its expressive content, but because it is tied to a specific prohibited
conduct.15 6 In contrast, the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell
upheld the constitutionality of a hate crime statute that provided an
The Court
enhanced penalty for hate motivated crimes.15 7
the hate
V.
from
in
R.A.
restriction
distinguished the content-based
crime statute that sought to regulate the conduct of intentional
discrimination in selecting a victim.15 8

In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of two minority preference policies implemented by
the FCC.15 9

Though partially overruled several years later, Metro

Broadcasting stands among a line of cases that suggests a
governmental interest in the increasing need for diversity in the
media.160

In Metro Broadcasting, the FCC's fatal error was in the
regulatory scheme it chose to implement.1 61 By utilizing non-remedial
racial preferences in an effort to increase minority representation, the
FCC's regulatory efforts were aimed at controlling the output or
content of the programming.1 62 This regulation of content subjected
the regulatory scheme to the highest standard of review-strict
scrutiny, which ultimately proved too high a bar to meet.1 63
154.
See Ardebili & Kronstadt, supra note 121.
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
155.
See id. at 409; see also Robinson, supra note 43, at 46 ("Title VII does not single out
156.
expressive industries; it regulates employment decisions by virtually all employers, including
studios, and applies regardless of a film's content.").
157.
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 476 (1993).
Frederick M. Lawrence, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), AM. Civ.
158.
LIBERTIES, http://uscivilliberties.org/cases/4711-wisconsin-v-mitchell-508-us-476-1993.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2015).
159.
See 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990).
160.
See generally id.
161.
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. et al., Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power,
Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 841-42 (2000) ("[It is
probable that the FCC's primary objective of promoting diversity . . . would not qualify as a
compelling governmental interest for equal protection purposes . . . failing the first prong of strict
scrutiny.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
See generally Neal E. Devins, Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a
162.
Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 127 (1990).
See Krotoszynski, supra note 161, at 841.
163.
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Any future attempts at a regulatory scheme that will pass
constitutional muster should consider an approach that focuses on
what can be considered "input": hiring norms and decisions involved
in the front end of a show's development, rather than on "output," or
Thus, a regulatory solution that
what is actually broadcast. 164
165
attempts to regulate conduct instead of content.
D. FirstAmendment and AntidiscriminationLaws
In the context of antidiscrimination suits, courts have
historically found that the application of antidiscrimination laws is a
7
violation of the First Amendment. 166 In Hurley 16 the Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) sought to be
168
The
included in Boston's annual Saint Patrick's Day parade.
Supreme Court considered whether, under Massachusetts law, private
citizens 169 organizing a parade could be forced to include marchers
170
Holding
depicting a message the organizers did not want to convey.
for the parade organizers, the Court said parades are a form of
First
the
under
protection
warranting
conduct
expressive
Amendment.171
Conversely, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting
17 2
in job postings. 173
newspapers from publishing sex classifications
The Court stressed that there was no category of "special immunity"
for the press regarding laws of general applicability like employment
are considered
advertisements
Furthermore,
regulations. 17 4
1 75
commercial speech and are thus not constitutionally protected.
Drawing a distinction between protected speech and commercial
See generally Robinson, supra note 43, at 47 (explaining that the weight of legal
164.
authority suggests that Title VII and other regulations addressing discrimination seek to
regulate conduct and not content).

See id.
165.
See Ardebili & Kronstadt, supra note 121.
166.
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 561 (1995).
167.
Id.
168.
169.
See id. at 557 (organizing the parade was a group composed of private citizens,
known as "South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, an unincorporated association of
individuals.").
See id.
170.
See id.
171.
The Pittsburgh Press newspaper in question included a "Help Wanted" section with
172.
sex-specific headers like "JOBS-Female Interest." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 379 (1973).
See id. at 376.
173.
Id. at 382 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937)).
174.
See id. at 384.
175.
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speech lacking First Amendment protection, the Court said,
"discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, [but]
illegal commercial activity."1 76
In Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, the First
Amendment prevented actress Vanessa Redgrave from recovering
under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) after defendants
cancelled her employment contract in response to Redgrave's political
commentary.17 7 On dissent, Judge Bownes expressed concern for the
broad discretion given artistic expression under the First
Amendment.178

Notwithstanding the concerns raised by Judge Bownes
regarding the broad application and absolute defense offered by the
First Amendment, courts have universally treated the application of
antidiscrimination laws as an unconstitutional ban to the freedom of
artistic expression. 7 9 Despite the government's attempts to remedy
racial misrepresentations and discriminatory practices, these
regulatory schemes have been proven to be overly intrusive
restrictions on the First Amendment; have presented problematic
implications; or have been expressly narrowed to a defined frame,
rendering them incapable of becoming viable solutions.1 80 In 2012, the
US District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dealt with an
issue of first impression: does the First Amendment of the US
Constitution protect casting decisions for entertainment works?

Id. at 388.
176.
See Redgrave v. Bos. Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1988).
177.
See id. at 925-26 (Bownes, J., dissenting) ("But perhaps the strongest illustration of
178.
the weakness of the BSO's asserted absolute first amendment defense lies in examining the
potentially nightmarish consequences of recognizing it. If the first amendment extends absolute
protection to the BSO when it fired Redgrave in response to public outcry over her political
views, why would it not also protect the BSO in caving in to public views about her sex, her race,
or her religion? If, in another case, the BSO refused to hire a Black performer because it felt that
protests by bigots would be so intense as to compromise the BSO's 'artistic integrity,' then the
Black performer should have a cause of action under the MCRA against the BSO for infringing
her rights under the equal protection clause and any analogous state constitutional provisions
banning race discrimination. But the 'artistic integrity' defense would impose a fatal barrier to
the application of the MCRA. And there is no reason to assume that the same defense would not
also extend to other institutions, such as newspapers and universities, that engage generally in
first amendment activity. In order to qualify for protection, these institutions would only need to
characterize their discriminatory acts as based on artistic or intellectual choices and thus
effectively foreclose legislative or judicial scrutiny.").
179.
See id. at 910.
See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003); Metro Broad., Inc. v.
180.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); Schoaff, supra note 139, at 229.
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E. The Claybrooks Analysis
While the Claybrooks Court was constrained by the judicial
tools available in making its assessment, 181 there are considerable
problems with the analysis adopted by the court that warrant a review
of the applicable First Amendment and antidiscrimination
jurisprudence.1 82 Those problems include the court's strict reliance on
Hurley and the application of the strict scrutiny standard of review.1 83
While the court concedes that the "factual circumstances in
Hurley are not precisely analogous to those presented in this case," it
nevertheless relies entirely on the Hurley analysis.1 84 In striking
down the antidiscrimination statute, the Hurley Court pointed out
that, like the great protection for editorial discretion, a parade was a
form of expressive conduct entitled to the utmost protection. 8 5
Moreover, the Court explained the definition of parade used in its
analysis as "marchers who are making some sort of collective point,
not just to each other but to bystanders along the way." 86
In defining the parade as expressive conduct, the Hurley Court
analogized to other forms of expressive conduct shielded by the First
Amendment, like wearing an armband in protest of war, saluting the
American Flag, marching in a Nazi uniform, or displaying a flag.' 8 1
However, in contrast to political expressive conduct, casting
decisions are arguably tangentially connected to the artistic content of
a show and thus are not analogous to the forms of expression set forth
Moreover, the regulation of casting decisions in
in Hurley.8 8
Claybrooks is closely analogous to Supreme Court precedent
establishing antidiscrimination laws, like Section 1981 or Title VII, as

181.
See Claybrooks v. Am. Broad. Cos., 898 F. Supp. 2d 986, 996 (M.D. Tenn. 2012)
("Accordingly, the court must analyze this issue of first impression in light of relevant First
Amendment principles.").
182.
See id. ("The parties fault each other for failing to identify any federal case law,
specifically addressing this issue . .. ").

But see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
183.
376, 379 (1973), for a case in which the Court held that First Amendment rights were not
implicated.
184.
Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d. at 995-96.
185.
See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 581
(1995).
Id. at 558.
186.
See id. at 569.
187.
188.
See generally Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 993 ("The parties agree that the Shows
are expressive works that constitute speech protected by the First Amendment. However, they
disagree as to whether the casting decisions behind those Shows are also protected by the first
Amendment.").
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laws that seek to regulate conduct. 189 Accordingly, in relying heavily
on Hurley's analysis and a strict scrutiny level of review,19 0 the court
neglected to adopt an analysis that could have survived constitutional

scrutiny. 191
In addition to the flawed logic used by the court, the plaintiffs
focus on the racially divisive message conveyed by the defendant's and
the plaintiffs proposed exception for "identity-themed shows" not only
encouraged the court's unwillingness to discern casting decisions from
the artistic content of the shows final product, but provided an
"inherently unwieldy" test that threatened to "chill protected speech"
and involve the courts in questioning the creative process behind the
production of any television program. 192
III. SOLUTION
A. Carving an Exception out of the FirstAmendment
In examining the problems faced by the Claybrooks court, this
Note proposes an exception to the First Amendment's broad protection
under the freedom of artistic expression for casting decisions in
race- and gender-neutral roles in reality television programs.1 93 To
determine which shows fall within the purview of the rule, this Note
proposes the following test: (1) cast members or contestants are chosen
from a screening process or open casting call, (2) the show is a
reality-based program, and (3) the show's programming is not wed to a
central script. To deter networks from escaping the scope of the rule,
this three-prong factor test would stress function over form. This
function over form test would thus prevent reality-based shows that
189.
See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 47
(2006); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 376 (1973).
190.
See Claybrooks, 898 F. Supp. 2d at n.11 ("In Hurley, the Court did not state whether
it was analyzing the application of the state statute under a strict scrutiny analysis or under the
O'Brien intermediate scrutiny analysis. However, the Court's analysis suggests that it was
undertaking a strict scrutiny approach to determine whether applying the Massachusetts antidiscrimination statute amounted to a content-based restriction on the parade organizer's
fundamental free speech rights in any respect.").
See id. at n.8 (explaining under the intermediate scrutiny analysis set forth in
191.
O'Brien, "a content-neutral statute that incidentally impact speech survives a First Amendment
challenge if (1) the statute is within the constitutional power of the government, (2) the statute
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, (3) the interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.").
192.
Id. at 898 ("The plaintiffs proposed test is inherently unwieldy, threatens to chill
otherwise protected speech, and, if implemented, would embroil courts in questioning the
creative process behind any television program or other dramatic work.").
See generally Robinson, supra note 43, at 47 (discussing content neutrality and the
193.
standards under which First Amendment claims are addressed).
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fall within the purview of the rule from escaping inclusion by creating
an ad hoc script or ad hoc modification to their casting process, merely
in order to avoid inclusion. Moreover, shows that purport to convey a
particular cultural or ethnic group or social phenomenon would be
outside the exception. 194
This functional test would apply to casting decisions involving
race- and gender-neutral roles in reality television programming for
First, reality television cast members should be
three reasons.
considered more akin to network employees, placing them under the
umbrella of Title VII's antidiscrimination protectionist measures. 195
Second, unlike casting decisions for scripted shows and movies,
casting for race- and gender-neutral roles in reality television
programs should not be considered expressive conduct inextricably
tied to the artistic process. 196 Third, the government should consider
diversity in reality-based programming to be a compelling state
interest due to the historical regulations imposed on broadcast media
and the purported aim of reality television to be a representative
sampling of reality.1 97 In asserting this compelling state interest, this
solution proposes an extension of the Supreme Court's rule in Grutter
beyond the educational setting and would apply it in the context of
broadcast and cable television.19 8
B. Cast Members as Employees
The first prong of the test deals with shows that are cast in a
way that most closely resembles standard employment hiring norms.
In assessing whether or not a reality show participant is an employee
of a television network, courts look to three elements. 99 First, an
individual must act "at least in part to serve the interests of the
employer." 200 Second, the employer consents to the services of the
employee. 201 Third, "the individual must not render his services as an

Shows, like Jersey Shore or Shahs of Sunset, that purport to represent a particular
194.
ethnic group or culture would be outside the rule. Also, networks like BET or Lifetime, which
purport to represent an intended group, would not be subject to the rule.
See Melody Hsiou, Harsh Reality: When Producers and Networks Should be Liable
195.
for Negligence and IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT.

L. 187, 196-97 (2013).
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Frank, supra note 126, at 520.
196.
See generally Honeycutt, supra note 130, at 453.
197.
See id.
198.
199.

2009).
200.
201.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW

Id.
Id.

§

1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
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independent business person because the employer controls the
manner and means by which the services are performed." 202
Contestants on The Bachelor and similar shows should be
considered employees of ABC because they satisfy all three elements.
The first element is satisfied because show producers select cast
members of The Bachelor because they serve the interests of network
producers-high ratings. 203 The second element is satisfied because
network producers conduct a rigorous selection process in choosing
cast members. 204 The very act of conducting an extensive application
process for the purpose of choosing cast members suggests implicit
consent to the services of cast members who are selected. 205
Furthermore, producers and cast members enter into a contractual
agreement, an action that further suggests the producer's consent to
cast members' services. 206
Finally, producers of reality shows like The Bachelor exercise a
significant level of control over the lives of cast members. 207 Reality
television producers control the travel and housing arrangements,
meals, date schedules, and daily schedules of cast members. 20 8
Furthermore, producers have ultimate authority over editing the show
and control how cast members' personalities are portrayed. 20 9 In
addition, show producers exercise a degree of control over when cast
members depart from the show and contractually bind them to refrain
from certain actions for an extended time period before and after the
show airs. 210
By serving the producer's interest in high ratings, 211 being
selected for participation through the show producers' audition
process, 212 and subjecting their lives to an extensive degree of
control, 213 cast members of reality programs satisfy the elements
necessary to establish employee status. Thus, cast members should be
considered employees of The Bachelor and ABC, Inc. 2 14

202.
Id.
203.
Hsiou, supra note 195, at 197.
204.
See id.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
See generally Honeycutt, supra note 130, at 451.
207.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
See Hsiou, supra note 195, at 197.
211.
212.
Id.
See Honeycutt, supra note 130, at 451.
213.
214.
See id. ("It is conceivable that reality show cast members could convince a court that
they are employees of the network.").
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C. SeparatingConduct from Content
The third prong of the factor test, addressing whether a show is
tied to a central script, intends to separate casting decisions that are
inextricably tied to content from casting decisions that are not. Under
the test established in Texas v. Johnson for expressive conduct,
casting decisions in reality television shows are arguably not
inextricably linked to artistic expression and could thus be entitled to
a lower standard of protection under the First Amendment. 215 Thus,
casting decisions should be considered to shape content only when
artistic narratives or scripts apply. 2 16 Unlike films and television
shows, in which the casting decisions are heavily tied to scripted
narratives and the artistic creation of a particularized message, the
casting decisions in reality television shows do not meet this standard
of artistic expression. 217 In scripted television shows and movies, such
casting decisions are tied to the artistic process because the casting is
done within the context of conveying the intended message of the
creative process-the writer's narrative. 218
television
reality
in
decisions
casting
Conversely,
programming, like The Bachelor, are not linked to an artistic
narrative and thus are not sufficiently tied to content or a proffered
message. 219 Unlike a scripted show in which there is an intended
message tied to a scripted artistic narrative, reality television shows
do not seek to hire contestants to convey a particular message. 220
Rather, they seek to hire for an intended purpose-depicting "real life"
in a reality-based setting. 22 1
While the distinction between casting decisions that regulate
content and those that regulate conduct may be seemingly narrow, it
is an important distinction to make in regards to the First
Amendment. Justice Rehnquist clarified the importance of the narrow
distinction between the two types of conduct:
"[Fireedom of speech" means more than simply the right to talk and to write. It is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes-for

example,

walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a

215.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
See generally Honeycutt, supra note 130, at 434.
216.
217.
Id.
Id. (clarifying that scripted programming is distinct from reality television
218.
programming in the context of the Johnson test, in that the existence of the script ties the
casting decisions inextricably up in the artistic process and the ultimate message reaching the
audience).
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
221.
Id.
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shopping mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the
222
protection of the First Amendment.

Thus, if casting decisions shape content only when artistic
narratives apply, then laws regulating casting decisions for race- and
gender-neutral reality television programming is a regulation of
conduct. 223 Under this analysis, the court in Claybrooks would have to
draw a distinction because the government is not interfering with
artistic means or forcing the means of an artistic process. 224 Rather,
the government is regulating a type of conduct tied to
Moreover, because content-neutral
employment-hiring norms.225
laws regulating conduct are subject to intermediate scrutiny, in order
to justifiably regulate conduct tied to the First Amendment, the court
in Claybrooks would have to establish that there is a compelling
governmental interest in such a regulation. 226
D. Compelling Interests: Policy Rationales and Extending Grutter
The second prong of the test narrows the exception to
reality-based programming. Extending Grutter beyond the context of
the educational setting would lay the groundwork for the Claybrooks
court to find a compelling governmental interest in regulating the
conduct of casting decisions in reality television programming. 227 The
analysis set forth in Grutter not only placed great emphasis on the
notion of diversity being at the heart of an institution of higher
learning's mission, but it also suggests that a compelling interest in
diversity should not be limited to the educational setting. 228 In
extending Grutter, the Claybrooks court should look to the reasoning
set forth in the analysis. 229 Just as the court highlighted that
diversity was a paramount governmental objective within the context

222.
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
223.
See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 94, at 51 (drawing a distinction between
conduct tied to expression and conduct).
224.
Id.
225.
Id. (explaining that regulating conduct sufficiently tied to speech does not
necessarily warrant an unconstitutional burden under the First Amendment).
226.
Id.
227.
See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) ("Effective participation
by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream
of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.").
228.
Id.; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of
Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1410 (2006) ("Because Grutter's
conception of diversity has remedial resonances and, even more so, because the opinion focuses
on society's need for meaningful integration, the implications of Grutter's holding cannot be
contained by university walls.").
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
229.
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of educational institutions, diversity in broadcast programming should
be a compelling interest because of what it purports to do. 230
Furthermore, the implications of the Fairness Doctrine and
other diversity regulations applied historically to broadcasting
supports an extension of Grutter to reality-based programming. 231 The
Fairness Doctrine and diversity regulations set forth by the FCC were
in response to the government's growing concern for the need to
properly inform members of the white American majority of the plight
faced by people of color and to paint an accurate portrait of our
Similarly, by regulating hiring norms in
national community. 232
race- and gender-neutral reality programs, the government is
regulating a realm of broadcasting that, by name, purports to capture
real life and thus gives rise to a compelling reason to regulate-to
ensure diversity and contribute to efforts aimed at presenting an
accurate depiction of society.2 33
Casting decisions are protected by the First Amendment as
expressive conduct when there is "intent to convey a particularized
message" 234 and a strong likelihood that those who viewed it would
understand the message. 235 Conduct like burning a flag, protesting by
wearing armbands, and the creation of a script can be considered
conduct that conveys a political message. 236 Casting for films and
scripted television programs is inherently tied to the artistic process
as expressive conduct because it involves conveying a particular
237
message-the central storyline or plot presented in the script.
Casting decisions in the above-mentioned programs are entitled to
strong First Amendment claims because they are inherently tied to a
238
mode of artistic expression-scriptwriting.
Conversely, by regulating hiring norms, this regulatory scheme
would be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Unlike the regulatory
scheme in Metro Broadcasting, which aimed to increase the diversity
on television by implementing non-remedial racial preferences, the
main goal of antidiscrimination laws is to remove barriers within the
See generally id. (elucidating that just as higher learning institutions are concerned
230.
with the social implications and benefits of diversity within its student body, so too is the
government concerned with the greater implications of diversity within society).
See Honeycutt, supra note 130, at 436.
231.
Id.
232.
233.
See id.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).
234.
235.
See id. at 404.
See generally id. (explaining the difference between conduct sufficiently tied to
236.
expression and conduct that is only tangentially tied to expression).
See Honeycutt, supra note 130 (explaining that the court could have determined the
237.
regulation sought to control conduct and not content on the facts).
Id.
238.
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hiring process. Instead of regulating the output of shows, regulating
the hiring process would, in turn, create a ripple effect and an
eventual shift in representation.
Thus, by drawing a distinction between regulating casting
decisions for race- and gender-neutral reality-based shows, like The
Bachelor, and casting decisions for scripted television shows and films,
the Claybrooks court could justifiably find that the plaintiffs stated a
viable claim for relief under Section 1981 and deny the defendant's
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without impermissibly interfering
with the defendant's freedom of artistic expression under the First
Amendment. 239 In reality programs lacking a narrative script, casting
decisions are not inherently tied to the artistic process as expressive
conduct because by their nature, they do not claim to involve the
conveyance of a particular message. 240 Here, casting decisions are
considered conduct-regulation of which controls employment hiring
and firing procedures. 241 Thus, without being tied to an artistic
message, casting decisions in race- and gender-neutral reality
programs are not subject to broad First Amendment treatment. 242
Shows that purport to represent certain cultural and ethnic
groups are outside the scope of the rule because these shows are not
considered race-neutral and deal with cultural nuances that aim to
portray an intended message. Moreover, these shows are outside the
scope of the policy rationales behind the exception because they help
to foster diversity in programming. Thus, while the reality show
exception appears to be overly broad, it only applies to a narrow sect of
reality programs.
In doing so, the rule avoids an overly broad
regulation that, admittedly, places an imposition on the First
Amendment rights of reality television network executives that is
outweighed by the social harms the rule seeks to address.
E. Implicationsof the Claybrooks Solution
By subjecting networks and network executives to the duties
that fall under discrimination and employment laws-particularly
Title VII and Section 1981-and by applying an exception to First
Amendment protections for race- and gender-neutral roles, reality

239.
See generally Robinson, supra note 43, at 47 (explaining that the weight of legal
authority suggests that Title VII and other regulations addressing discrimination seek to
regulate conduct and not content).
240.
See id.
241.
See generally id.
242.
Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
391 (1973).
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television programming will begin to reflect the same diversity found
in today's workforce. 243
The media has the power to depict reality "in ways that can
produce or transform social inequality." 2 44 Because "representational
tools" like reality television programming have the power to enforce
cultural norms, they in turn have the power to "reorganize
people's sense of self, build alternative conceptions of realizable
futures, and . . . function as agents of social transformation." 245 Thus,
television's depiction of racial minority groups has the power to
achieve far-reaching social consequences that "can serve to create,
reinforce, or change disparaging stereotypes.1"246
By being exposed to more diversity in reality television
of television
form
viewed
widely
most
programming-the
can begin
discrimination
and
stereotyping
programming today-racial
to dismantle and society's collective perception of who and what types
247
of people make up our society will begin to transform.
It is through this collective change in perception that societal
pressures will begin to "trickle-down" and influence other forms of
48
Once
media-sitcoms, talk shows, news programming, and films. 2
members of society are able to see a realistic depiction of the various
types of people who make up our collective society, public perception
will change and media will begin to mimic life. 2 4 9 When casting
directors feel the need to fill roles with an actress without regard to
her racial status or give equal consideration to a black actor and a
white actor when attempting to fill the role of a man without the
pressure to adhere to a social norm that no longer exists-only then
will the problems of race in the media and society as a whole begin to
deconstruct. 250

243.
Robinson, supra note 43, at 47.
244.
Drew, supra note 44, at 341.
245.
Id.
246.
Ford, supra note 19, at 266.
247.
See generally id. (explaining the importance of challenging suits like Claybrooks in
order to encourage more diversity and because of the possibility of a future successful suit).
248.
Id. at 460 ("Should this happen, the benefits will far exceed the merely pragmatic,
and in their small way, strike a blow for equality of representation in the American media.").
249.
Id.
250.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION: AN IMMOVABLE OBJECT AND AN UNSTOPPABLE
FORCE
"I've learned over a period of years there are setbacks when you come up against the
251
immovable object; sometimes the object doesn't move."-Coleman Young

In examining the Claybrooks decision, this Note attempts to
reconcile two foundational pillars upon which this country rests: the
freedom of speech and artistic expression without unreasonable
governmental interference under the First Amendment; and the right
to equal access and opportunity for every citizen, regardless of race,
sex, religion, color, or national origin under the Civil Rights Act of
1964. So what happens when two vitally important doctrines collide?
Is one obliterated for the sake of the other? Do both crumble to the
ground?
When an immovable object meets an unstoppable force, they
inevitably collide. But when the dust settles, perhaps something new
is created-a nook, a small space where the two come together
perfectly. That new space is what this Note attempts to create. An
exception to the First Amendment's freedom of artistic expression that
impedes minimally, if not insignificantly, on liberties protected under
that right in order to serve a socially relevant goal: the breakdown in
racial stereotyping and outgroup marginalization perpetuated by an
industry and society desperately in need of a reality check.
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